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The Made Man and the “Minor” Novel:  
Erewhon, ANT, and Empire
Anna Neill
To draw a line from F. R. Leavis to Bruno Latour would be to trace how the concept of the “great novel” features in literary criticism’s recent de-privileging of the human (Latour, “Agency” 9). For Leavis, 
of course, novels that earned a place in the Great Tradition captured the essen-
tially moral and psychological characteristics of human life; they demonstrated 
a “reverent openness” before such life and an awareness of its possibilities (9). 
Above all, they preserved the spontaneity of human minds in a world of utili-
tarian calculation, allowing the organic impulse to triumph over the mechan-
ical one. Latour, whose work has had enormous influence on the critical turn 
against anthropocentrism, has recently defined the “great novel” as a medium 
for capturing the entanglements of matter—human and non-human, organic 
and non-organic—as it “disseminate[s] the sources of actions” across a vast 
field of actors (“Agency” 8). Its form recognizes the networked agency of the 
non-human along with the human. And as if to check literary criticism’s linger-
ing Leavisite privileging of the organic, he advocates for a fiction that attempts 
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the “interpretation of machines” and gives voice to the hybrid entities generat-
ing and generated by technological innovation (Aramis viii).
Latour’s example of a “great novel” is Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace 
(1867).  The lengthy nineteenth-century novel with its many-threaded plots 
seems a likely choice because it is sensitive to what Charles Dickens called 
the “connexion . . . between many people in the innumerable histories of this 
world, who, from opposite sides of great gulfs are curiously brought together” 
(Bleak House [1852–53] 235). Such connections are in turn enabled by man-
ifold agentic forces in which the human does not assume any special status. 
Indeed, in Dickens’s writing, connection is assisted by what Hippolyte Taine 
described as “an enthusiasm . . . that will make a sort of human” out of a “vulgar 
object” (339). These forces and sources of social realignment therefore include 
everything from the petty objects of everyday life to the newly- invented contrap-
tions that feed and further industrialization and empire. The first half of this 
essay will consider works by Dickens and George Eliot to show how non-human 
entities, particularly machines, enable forms of physical and psychological con-
nection that make it possible for their novels to have such enormous social 
reach. I will focus on the train as one kind of machine that accrues agency 
and transformatively mediates relations among numerous other actors within 
far-reaching social and sympathetic networks. The second half will turn to a 
self-described “lesser” novel, Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1872), written and set 
in a British colony.  In this story, machines, including trains, are extensions 
of human bodies and as a result become motive-driven agentic beings. Yet 
such beings do not in this novel forge new connections in the social realm 
or broaden the scope of sympathy as non-human entities do in, for example, 
Eliot’s longer novels.  Instead, the intertwining of human and machine in 
Erewhon results ultimately in an abstraction and reification of the European 
human as a “made man.” Correspondingly, this process makes way for the dis-
possession and exploitation of the indigenous figures in the novel, who become 
less than human in a decidedly hierarchical chain of being.
In this context, my use of the terms “great” (or for Eliot, “serious”) and 
“minor” or “lesser” is not evaluative, but rather identifies how the authors 
and critics I am discussing represent networked relations between the human 
and non-human. I will argue that the relative narrative poverty of Butler’s 
Erewhon can be read as an expression of resistance to imperial, machine- 
mediated networks and the abstractions of value that they make possible in 
the labor of colonial adventurers. The made men who discover a wealth and 
security in the colonies that they lacked in the metropole, the novel shows, rely 
on a vast imperial infrastructure in which complex relations between human 
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and machine actors make it possible for goods and capital to move rapidly 
around the globe. In this interpretation, the shame that Butler professes about 
his  novel’s feeble plot and thinly-drawn characters appears somewhat disingen-
uous, for Erewhon is deliberately rejecting the rich agentic networks of what 
Latour identifies as the “great novel.”
Butler’s novel teaches us that our current critical romance with anti- 
anthropocentric, actor-network-rich forms of representation forgets how a flat 
ontology may play out in the history of colonial capital and empire. Even as we 
have learned to read against a metaphysics that elevates the human above other 
entities, or that ignores the entanglements of human subjects with non-human 
objects, we need to remain alert to the histories in which the human and the 
non-human find definition and agency. The point here is not to correct Latour, 
for whom our habitual and philosophical quarantining of subjects from objects 
has meant “withdrawing historicity from the [objective] world” (“Agency” 13). 
Rather, it is to attend to the historicity of network itself. Through its “minor” 
form, I propose, Erewhon attempts to do exactly that.
Latour himself reads Erewhon as a cautionary parable about the segrega-
tion of non-human agents from the realms of human passions and politics. In 
the story, the Erewhonians—an isolated society hidden in the Southern Alps 
of New Zealand—believe that evolution spells the eventual enslavement of 
humanity to the machine. Ultimately, they prophesy, technology will arrive at 
such a point that it will render humans mere parasites on the very inventions 
they have brought to life. Persuaded that they must do everything they can to 
prevent the monstrous eventuality of the post-human future, the Erewhonians 
destroy all of their machines, or else quarantine them in museums and imprison 
or execute anyone suspected of using them. In Aramis, or the Love of Technology 
(1993), Latour turns Erewhon into a cautionary allegory about the silencing of 
technology. As a means of giving voice to the machine, his account of the fail-
ure of Paris’s plan for a personalized rapid transit system (“The Aramis”) in the 
1970s and 1980s includes a mish-mash of engineers’ reports, interviews, news-
paper articles, technical documents, and other media to augment the fictional 
exchange between an engineer and a Sociology professor about the demise of 
the project. This assembly of voices (one whose use of documentary fragments 
is novelistic in the style of Bram Stoker’s Dracula [1897]) aspires to “[restore] 
freedom to all the realities involved before any one of them could succeed in 
unifying the others” (Aramis ix). It aims to animate the machine by identify-
ing the enormous cast of actors—or, more properly, actants, since their agency 
does not imply consciousness—that first brought Aramis to life and then con-
demned it to death.
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Aramis therefore is intended to read as a “great novel” in Latour’s sense of 
the term. It brings together a disparate collection of events, plans, accidents, 
and ambitions that together create a historical drama, in this instance with 
a non-human protagonist at its center. This form of narrative looks back to 
eighteenth-century speaking “it-narratives” (narrated by coins, banknotes, 
and pins). But it also recalls voluminous nineteenth-century narratives, such 
as Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend (1865), where discarded matter helps to drive 
the human plot and lies at the heart of a complex social web; or it invokes, as 
I shall discuss below, the networks of sympathy in Eliot’s novels that ultimately 
challenge human autonomy. Rather than pointing mutely to the post-human 
future—as Latour suggests the Erewhonian machines do—Aramis, like these 
capacious nineteenth-century precursors, seeks out and gives voice to non- 
human entities within a tangle of actants.
Victorianists have long been interested in narrative representations of 
non-human objects. Victorian drawing rooms remind us, as John Plotz has put 
it, how Victorians “loved their things,” as well as how these very things con-
firmed, expanded, and mobilized domestic English identity in an age of impe-
rial expansion (1).1 Major studies such as Asa Briggs’s Victorian Things (1988), 
Isobel Armstrong’s Victorian Glassworlds: Glass Culture and the Imagination 1830–
1880 (2008), and Andrew H. Miller’s Novels Behind Glass: Commodity Culture and 
Victorian Narrative (1995) have traced the movement and representation of 
objects within the homogenized or abstracted global spaces created and main-
tained by the circulation of commodities, even as these studies also recognize 
the disturbances and ruptures of such spaces.2 Others, by Elaine Freedgood, 
Plotz, and Armstrong (in more recent work), have shown how objects carry a 
resonance not entirely reducible to the cycle of production and consumption, 
evoking rich material histories and provoking affective attachments that belong 
to other kinds of flows and transfers.3 Perhaps most significantly here, Caroline 
Levine has foregrounded how the demotion of human actors occurs in net-
worked space: the lengthy Victorian novel affords the depiction of a complex 
layering and overlapping of networks in which characters function as nodes, 
and through which multiple invisible social forces pass and intersect. All of this 
suggests that—while many of the period’s most ambitious works of fiction trace 
the dance of subjects and objects within vast commercial, imperial, industrial, 
and social networks—objects, including those objects that Victorians made, 
cannot be understood entirely within human-driven systems, nor can their 
identity and reach be circumscribed by human desire.4
So how do we assess the role of non-human things, especially mechanical 
things, in a fiction whose representational reach remains modest? Despite its 
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reference to Erewhon, Latour’s twentieth-century Parisian saga really looks back 
to the great British nineteenth-century novel in which objects can be emanci-
pated from human consciousness within vast actant networks that individual 
minds cannot grasp. On the other hand, Butler’s first-person, somewhat for-
mulaic, novella-length account of the manners of a remote and isolated peo-
ple does not have scope enough to capture such fantastic webs of agency. In 
Latour’s reading, the suppression and silencing of the machines that threaten 
to take over in Erewhon is a metaphor for the way that scientific objectivity 
dispenses with all non-human agency. But read as a story about colonial New 
Zealand, the novel shows us how these mechanical entities become mobilized 
within imperial networks precisely because they carry an agency that is at once 
independent of human will and desire, and also capable of acting upon these. 
Butler reminds us that, even as we try to respect their ontologies and recog-
nize our entanglements with them, such entities are easily reabsorbed into the 
stream of capital. Despite the richly interwoven plots of realist novels, then, 
Erewhon is paradoxically more alert to the colonial dimensions of narrativized 
networks than its more dilatory and metropolitan literary cousins.
The perpetual entanglement of human and non-human agents is richly 
portrayed in what might be described as the great novels of the global North. I 
will begin with works by Dickens and Eliot that foreground the role of machines 
and other non-humans in actor networks, even where the  network is the con-
duit for distinctly human experiences and exchanges of sympathy. The narra-
tive consciousness of these novels outdistances, even rejects, a humanism that 
locates narrative authority in the mind. In an implicit challenge to these ambi-
tious narrative forms, I will argue, Erewhon shows how networks that embrace 
the motives and machinations of the non-human may not be innocent of 
human desire and design. Despite its superficial satire on the  narrow vision 
of an anti-modern, machine-phobic culture, Erewhon can be read as skepti-
cal of the anti-humanist, network-sensitive reach of the great novel. Reading 
Butler’s story carefully can give us pause before we inadvertently re- invoke the 
Great Tradition, this time for works of art in which “networks . . . link people 
and objects” across great distances (Levine 21).
Novels and Trains
Latour’s reading of War and Peace focuses on the passage in which Prince 
Kutuzov decides to begin military engagement. Here, what the narrator calls 
“inevitable movement” and “accomplished facts” are recognizably assemblages 
of a vast number of events preceding the decision (qtd. in Latour, “Agency” 9). 
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It is this awareness of his own lack of autonomy that actually enables Kutuzov to 
defeat Napoleon Bonaparte, whose megalomania is ultimately the cause of his 
defeat. In this passage, subjects and objects become confused because agency is 
not aligned discretely with a decision-making subject. Such “common ground 
of agency,” usually unexamined, is captured in the novel that tracks apparently 
individually-motivated decisions to a multitude of actions, including those that 
have taken place at a great distance (“Agency” 8).
As Latour recognizes, the War and Peace example represents the dissem-
ination of agency across principally human networks. He therefore moves 
from Tolstoy to John MacPhee’s 1990 bestseller, The Control of Nature, read-
ing that novel’s depiction of a struggle between natural forces and the Corps 
of Engineers as a drama of competing motives and goals. However, a nine-
teenth-century precursor to the way Aramis, in particular, has depicted the 
entanglements of matter and dissemination of agency beyond the human can 
be found in Dickens’s depictions of railway travel. Take, for example, a scene 
from Our Mutual Friend in which it becomes hard to discern where the human 
drama is distinct from the activity of mechanical actors. About two thirds of the 
way through the novel, Bella Wilfer and John Rokesmith start to fall in love. It 
is not so much the human as the non-human actors in the scene, however, who 
seem attuned to their developing feelings for one another:
The railway, at this point, knowingly shutting a green eye and opening a red one, 
they had to run for it. As Bella could not run easily so wrapped up, the Secretary had 
to help her. When she took her opposite place in the carriage corner, the brightness 
in her face was so charming to behold, that on her exclaiming, “What beautiful stars 
and what a glorious night!” the Secretary said “Yes,” but seemed to prefer to see the 
night and the stars in the light of her lovely little countenance, to looking out of 
the window.
O boofer lady, fascinating boofer lady! If I were but legally executor of Johnny’s will! 
If I had but the right to pay your legacy and to take your receipt!—Something to this 
purpose surely mingled with the blast of the train as it cleared the stations, all know-
ingly shutting up their green eyes and opening their red ones when they prepared 
to let the boofer lady pass. (594)
I have suggested elsewhere that this passage liberates the narrative voice from 
the consciousness of the human characters, who seem only dimly aware of 
their blossoming passion. Instead, narrative intuition is distributed among the 
“knowing” train stations, blasting train horn, winking lights, and the spirit of 
a dead child who once named Bella the “boofer lady.”5 Here, clearly, there 
is no discrete, individual human awareness unfolding against a background 
of dead or otherwise inanimate objects. Nor is this quite an instance of the 
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pathetic fallacy gone mad, in which life and humanity is drained out of  people 
by things, as Dorothy Van Ghent described in Dickens.6 Instead, knowing 
non-human objects take the place of an omniscient, organizing narrator, fore-
telling connections soon to be revealed among disparate characters and events. 
This narrative device does more than simply animate and anthropomorphize 
non-human entities. For the railway and the ghost are both “quasi subjects” 
(“Agency” 5); they share awareness and—given the sequence of events that will 
precipitate the couple’s union—agency with the human subjects who, like them, 
are no longer (if indeed they ever were) autonomous entities.
Similarly, in Dombey and Son (1848) the (demonic rather than benevolent) 
figure of the train seems at first to be a projection of human feeling. In bit-
terness at the death of his son, Mr. Dombey finds “a likeness to his misfortune 
everywhere” (312). In his mind, the train’s inexorable rush towards its destina-
tion becomes a modern incarnation of a scythe-wielding Death. The scenes that 
flash before the eyes of the passengers are only so many forms of life that will 
inevitably be cut down:
Breasting the wind and light, the shower and sunshine, away, and still away, it rolls 
and roars, fierce and rapid, smooth and certain, and great works and massive bridges 
crossing up above, fall like a beam of shadow an inch broad, upon the eye, and then 
are lost. Away, and still away, onward and onward ever: glimpses of cottage-homes, of 
houses, mansions, rich estates, of husbandry and handicraft, of people, of old roads 
and paths that look deserted, small, and insignificant as they are left behind: and 
so they do, and what else is there but such glimpses, in the track of the indomitable 
monster, Death!
Away, with a shriek, and a roar, and a rattle, plunging down into the earth again, and 
working on in such a storm of energy and perseverance, that amidst the darkness 
and whirlwind the motion seems reversed, and to tend furiously backward, until a 
ray of light upon the wet wall shows its surface flying past like a fierce stream, away 
once more into the day, and through the day, with a shrill yell of exultation, roaring, 
rattling, tearing on, spurning everything with its dark breath, sometimes pausing for 
a minute where a crowd of faces are, that in a minute more are not; sometimes lap-
ping water greedily, and before the spout at which it drinks has ceased to drip upon 
the ground, shrieking, roaring, rattling through the purple distance! (311–12)
“The power that force[s] itself upon its iron way” is apparently a figment of 
Dombey’s tortured imagination, incongruously assigning intention and appe-
tite to iron and steam (311). Yet the demon engine is more than the crea-
ture of his depressed fancy. To some degree it represents a fusion of animal 
and machine, where the mechanical cannot be understood in opposition to 
the emotional,7 or where humans assume the characteristics of self-regulating 
machines.8
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But it is the diminishing of autonomous human faculties that really comes 
into focus here. With their fantastic acceleration, trains had enormously 
impacted, even annihilated, traditional perceptions of time and space—a phe-
nomenon famously captured in J. M. W. Turner’s Rain, Steam and Speed—The 
Great Western Railway (1844) where, even as the observing eye falters before the 
blurred outline of objects, the mind begins to grasp how forces beyond its pow-
ers of representation are shaping perception.9 Rail speed and even rail disaster 
(which will ultimately enable multiple plot resolutions in Dombey and Son) occur 
in what Nicholas Daly calls “machine time”: a sequence of events too rapid for 
the human sensorium to register, let alone trigger a reaction (23). Even while 
it outpaces the human mind’s capacity to predict and prepare for events in 
its environment, machine time is simultaneously reassuringly predictable and 
homogenous, precisely because it does not depend upon human movement or 
attention. It is the train, then, and not Dombey’s gothic anthropomorphizing 
of it that brings so many varied scenes into one continuous space, positing 
connections between rich and poor, and between urban-industrial and rural 
spaces. Indeed, lest the reader be too eager to understand the train’s monstros-
ity as the projection of Dombey’s diseased psychology, or as a metaphor for his 
emerging awareness of the destruction nurtured by industrial-imperial greed, 
the narrator pulls back to show us what Dombey himself cannot grasp: “As 
Mr. Dombey looks out of his carriage window, it is never in his thoughts that the 
monster who has brought him there has let the light of day in on these things: 
not made or caused them” (312). The train—seemingly alive, seizing the scene 
with the help of active verbs that allow it to roar and yell and tear and drink, 
demonstrate perseverance and exultation, and hurtle human bodies at unnat-
ural speed through landscapes within which they now have almost no immer-
sive experience—is not merely likened to but is itself the source of the sensory 
upheaval that amplifies Dombey’s bleak thoughts. As such, it is also revelatory; 
it casts light on changes that are otherwise visible only at a scale that human 
consciousness cannot grasp: the evacuation of the premodern landscape, the 
new disparities of wealth that industrialization has created, and the vanishing of 
traditional modes of production. To the extent that narrative can capture such 
revelations, it makes new modes of human perception possible.
For Dickens, the train is therefore a key actor in the great novelistic project 
that draws numerous and complex connections among disparate places and 
events. This perhaps explains why Leavis did not include him among the great 
novelists, claiming that (with the exception of Hard Times [1854]) his novels 
lacked a “sustained seriousness” (19). The imbrication of machine “know-
ing,” anticipation, perception, and even design with human motives distracted 
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Dickens, in Leavis’s view, from what Leavis championed in Eliot as a  “profoundly 
serious interest in life” (18). Yet Eliot too shows how the non-human (and even 
at times the non-organic) world is deeply implicated in the human one, espe-
cially when that world is grasped, by means of sympathy, as a vast web of events 
and actors.
Sympathy in the Serious Novel
In Dickens’s writing, our perception and recognition of a vast arena of 
interrelated events is made possible by allowing the perspectives, passions, and 
motives of non-humans to jostle among those of human beings; in Eliot’s nov-
els, the wide web of sympathy that enables moral life can paradoxically crush 
the human psyche. What Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth has described in Eliot’s con-
ception of moral sympathy as the “mutual influence of dissimilar destinies” and 
“a sense of connection between widely separated lives” involves understanding 
how social being is formed in the recognition of difference (42). Sympathy 
therefore respects what Eliot calls “inevitable kinship” with the non-human, 
the “minim mammal” that is related to the great philosophical mind (Daniel 
Deronda [1876] 471), or “contemptible details” like a “dirty old barouche” that 
nonetheless must be accounted for in the “turning of lives” (228). This is the 
view of sympathy that drives contempt for what she describes in the essay “Silly 
Novels by Lady Novelists” (1856) as works whose high society authors have “no 
close acquaintance with any other form of life” (245). By implication, “serious” 
novels endeavor to portray life as a web of sympathies, to capture the recogni-
tions of difference that make social existence possible; they are therefore likely 
to be dilatory accounts of minds opening to others as their protagonists are 
woven into multiple plots and linked to a wide cast of other characters.10 This 
focus on a great network of relations turns narrative authority away from the 
autonomous, world-making human subject.
Acknowledging Dickens’s “greatness,” Eliot praised his “power of 
 rendering . . . external traits,” and added that, were he equally gifted at por-
traying psychological character, “his books would be the greatest contribution 
Art has ever made to the awakening of social sympathies” (“Natural History” 
143). Eliot’s own fiction aims to provoke sympathy, “surpris[ing] even the trivial 
and the selfish into . . . attention to what is apart from themselves” by means of 
deep psychological portraiture, capturing the complex motives in relation to 
others that structure every human action, sometimes beneath the threshold of 
conscious awareness (142). In order to grasp such complexity, she argues, we 
must begin by recognizing the crudeness of our representational tools. In the 
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word “railway,” for example, is embedded not just a familiar station or an image 
of track stretching as far as the eye can see, but also a multitude of other con-
crete items of knowledge and experience, such as would manifest more imme-
diately in the minds of a “‘navvy,’ an engineer, a traveller, a railway director and 
a shareholder, [or] a landed proprietor in treaty with a railway company”; only 
if we combine all these essential facts do we have “the existence and relations 
of the thing” (139). Eliot’s conception of “thing” here is quite a lot like Latour’s: 
the thing is an assemblage, a collection of “complex facts summed up in [a] 
collective term” (140). Only by recognizing the collective nature of things do 
we become capable of sympathy.
Of course, Eliot’s teasing out of human connections and relations with 
regard to a non-human entity is more concentrated on the institution of the 
railway than on its machines. Moreover, in Middlemarch (1871–72), it has been 
noticed, the railway is at once something that involves a concrete historical web 
of actors and a “preindustrial” organic entity that “breeds” and suffers “infant 
struggles,” and whose figuration is in part an effort to hold on to the experi-
ential and the local in the face of the ever-increasing abstraction of value in 
economic-industrial modernity (Givner 228). In this combination, the railway 
becomes a repository of human sympathy in which face-to-face recognition of 
the joys and sufferings of others can be experientially broadened into a wider 
world of institutionally driven connections.
Elsewhere in Eliot’s writing, however, the non-human is what stands at the 
limits of sympathy, and the task of the narrative is to push against these limits 
and draw the objects that lie outside them into its fold. This, for her, is the 
difference between greater and lesser minds. At one extreme lies a form of 
sympathy so exquisite that it can distill spiritual meaning and destiny out of 
“unnumbered impressions”—Mordecai’s prophetic gift in Daniel Deronda. At 
the other extreme lie characters like the self-serving aristocratic Grandcourt, 
whose instincts are so narrow as to be like those of an insect, or (strangely kin 
to him) the cataleptic Silas Marner. The greatness of psychological realism, 
then, lies in its capacity to imitate the expansive mind: to create a “narrow por-
tal” that will filter and make meaningful an “inrush” of perceptions (Deronda 
471). At the same time, a single consciousness may not be able to endure such 
understanding: in Middlemarch, for instance, the narrator famously describes 
how “if we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would 
be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die 
of that roar which lies on the other side of silence” (192). The price of truly 
grasping the social and its fantastic relay of human and non-human actors, in 
other words, may be emotional disintegration.
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This paradox at the heart of Eliot’s novels—that sympathy is at once the key 
to sociability and also a force that may de-animate the human—anticipates the 
non-anthropocentric, object-oriented focus of much current critical thought. 
Latour describes “the network of individuals, the welter of equipment, the pullu-
lations of occasions” that make up the stream of human and non-human events 
constituting the social (Style 24). But others have proposed more specifically how 
sympathy diminishes the human. Blakey Vermeule, for instance, describes how lit-
erary forms enhance sympathetic feeling and sociality by engaging in “mind blind-
ness” (68), an opacity in the depiction of character that temporarily de-animates 
and dehumanizes the social world in order to exercise the reader’s mind-reading 
skills. Hence, strangely, the deliberate shrinking of other minds into objects lies at 
the core of social feeling. In a similar vein, Rae Greiner reveals how novelistic real-
ism captures the very failure of minds to grasp the content of other minds; it is only 
by preserving the distance between self and other that social order becomes rep-
resentable.11 And Jonathan Lamb has proposed that acts of sympathetic kindness 
are possible only with the crushing of the ego and utter abjection of the human 
subject.12 These accounts of sympathy point to the speculative nature of realism: as 
Ian Bogost has put it, objects become accessible to thinking subjects only through 
an “alien phenomenology” (40). Neither fully accessible nor infinitely removed 
from us, objects reveal only those portions of themselves that are in dynamic rela-
tion with other objects or parts of objects, including ourselves. Otherwise, they are 
secret and unreadable. As a mode of speculative realism, sympathy is full of peril 
for the autonomous subject and its confident mapping of a horizon of objects.
The anti-humanism of the great novel is therefore found in the way that it 
ranges across so many characters, objects, places, and events, and through so 
many pages. Whether concentrated on the discovery of a much larger world 
than the ego can ever manage or manipulate, like the awareness that throws 
Gwendolen Harleth into a cataleptic fit, or narratively pulled away from human 
consciousness to the exhilarated “mind” of an object, as in Dombey and Son, the 
great novel’s unravelling of human autonomy is tied to its depiction of a net-
work. This is the vast web of entities through which the human and non-human 
are imbricated, or through which sympathy routes minds to other minds even 
as it humbles thought in the face of what it cannot grasp and subdue.
The Made Man and the Machine
Erewhon has none of the webby realism of a great novel. Indeed, in his 
preface to the revised edition, Butler expresses astonishment that this early 
novel received the recognition it did given its “literary inelegancies” (xv) and 
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the fact that there was “hardly any story and little attempt to give life and indi-
viduality to the characters” (xvi). Of course both characterization and plot are 
limited by the genre of utopia (or sometimes dystopia). Although the open-
ing scenes in which the narrator, Higgs, journeys across a mountain range in 
search of good grazing land are based on Butler’s own experiences in New 
Zealand, the semi-autobiographical aspect of the story quickly recedes.13 Most 
of the narrative instead describes the manners and institutional histories of the 
strange country into which Higgs stumbles: punishments for illness instead of 
crime; a system of coinage that rewards corrupt church ministers; “Colleges 
of Unreason”; a discourse on vegetarianism that devalues human rights; and 
(my focus here) “The Book of the Machines,” which describes how industrial 
revolution was reversed and machines were outlawed in Erewhon. Through 
these descriptions, Erewhon seems more interested in outlining the hypocrisies 
of English society than in fleshing out the characters and fortunes of the real or 
imaginary inhabitants of a remote country in the South Pacific.
Reviewers had mixed responses. The Examiner suggested that the novel 
“recalls the memorable performance of Gulliver’s Travels,” but went on to say 
that it was “too abstract, too thickly studded with argumentative expostulation 
and not sufficiently translated into the concrete forms of daily life to rival . . . 
Swift’s satire” (“Erewhon” 432). The Athenaeum condemned it as a “slovenly” 
and “inconsistent” satire (492). The Saturday Review praised “a good many inge-
nious remarks and some caustic hits in the book,” but complained that “on the 
whole the allegory seems too farfetched and complicated to have the desirable 
brilliancy of effect” (508). Without any real depth of characterization or some 
modicum of realism with which to anchor the narrative, these reviews con-
curred, readers could not be engaged long enough to laugh at the absurdity of 
foreign manners, let alone to recognize them as their own.
Yet this poverty of character and narrowness of reach can serve as a route 
into the rather complex colonial politics of the novel. One formal way of read-
ing Erewhon as critical toward colonialism is through its sophisticated manip-
ulation of genre. As David Amigoni has pointed out, the novel uses satiric 
defamiliarization to challenge assumptions about sovereignty and the human 
that come from Darwinian evolutionism as much as from racial anthropology.14 
Focusing on the utopia form specifically, Sue Zemka has compellingly argued 
that Butler upturns a tradition whose roots are profoundly humanist in order 
to undermine a metaphysics of the human upon which colonial ideology rests. 
Despite opening scenes that deploy familiar colonial tropes of pastoral har-
mony through the enclosure of wild lands and the distinctions between civilized 
and savage, subhuman peoples, she points out, subsequent chapters repeatedly 
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undermine the ontological distinctions that justify colonial  expansion. In 
 particular, the chapters on vegetarianism (in which the Erewhonians risk star-
vation when they speculate on the suffering of vegetables as well as animals) 
and in “The Book of the Machines” (where the boundaries between human 
and machine bodies becomes entirely porous) undo the privileged category 
of the human. “The figure of the human succumbs to a catastrophic collapse 
of its structuring antimonies” in a context wherein the question of what consti-
tutes the human carries an enormous charge (Zemka 465). In what others have 
celebrated in the novel as the shattering of the discrete categories of organism 
and machine, Zemka identifies an implicit critique of the colonial project. The 
defeat of humanism is signaled in what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari iden-
tify as the desiring machine of Erewhon, in which both bodies and machines are 
engineered through an incorporation of the other.15
Yet Erewhon also reminds us that in the relationship between technology 
and empire a new kind of human subject appears whose autonomy, value, and 
power over others—especially other humans—is predicated on the antihuman-
ism of the machine age. Read this way, the novel does not celebrate the collapse 
of human-non-human distinctions at all. Instead it recognizes in that collapse 
how the dethroning of discretely human agency is bound up with acts of 
enclosure and dispossession brought about by the expansionist pressures and 
technological affordances of industrial capitalism. Although far from overtly 
anti-colonial, Erewhon’s famously hard-to-pin-down satire in combination with 
its “poor” form, or literary “minorness,” indicates ambivalence toward the 
richer narratives that entwine humans and non-human objects within immense 
social networks.
Strikingly, given that the novel establishes a colonial setting that it later 
seems to forget, reviewers either ignored or, like the Athenaeum, outright praised 
the opening chapters that precede the narrator’s discovery of Erewhon. These 
chapters, which unabashedly applaud the heroic settler spirit, describe Higgs’s 
experiences on a Canterbury sheep farm and his journey into the mountains 
in search of new grazing land. Based largely on Butler’s own experiences as a 
short-term colonist in New Zealand between 1860 and 1864, this section draws 
on real events from settler history. In the 1850s, the Crown opened “waste” 
lands for farming, a signature act of enclosure in the new colony. Although 
most of the available runs had been spoken for by 1860, remoter areas, par-
ticularly further west in the MacKenzie country, held out the promise of yet- 
undiscovered  grazing land. Higgs, like Butler, becomes an explorer in this 
region in hopes that “if I could only find workable country, I might stock it 
with borrowed capital, and consider myself a made man” (“A First Year” 7). 
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Like Butler, too, he proves to be a temporary resident of the colony, what James 
Smithies calls a “transnational entrepreneur” (211). According to Smithies, the 
transnational mobility of middle-class Victorians—the quite rapid movement 
that many undertook back and forth between metropole and periphery—
belies the too frequent assumption that Butler “was living in a frontier society 
consisting solely of pastoralism and wide open spaces” (212). By the 1860s, New 
Zealand was both industrialized—a railway system, a telegraph line, and a major 
bridge were all in the process of construction in the Canterbury settlement 
when Butler arrived—and integrated into a global economy in which sheep’s 
wool, in particular, had considerable currency.16 Despite having roughed it in 
the wilderness, the made man is profoundly embedded in a highly technolo-
gized imperial economy.
Also belonging to these early sections is the novel’s lone Māori charac-
ter, Higgs’s unreliable guide, improbably named “Chowbok.” Chowbok is a 
creation of Victorian racial anthropology: “grotesque,” “fiendish,” excessively 
superstitious, and close to primitive nature (13). His character signifies a famil-
iar distinction between the fully human landed settler and the subhuman or 
nature-bound landless native, a false characterization that in turn serves to 
justify enclosure. This characterization also invokes particular events in New 
Zealand’s colonial history, specifically Māori/Pākehā (settler) relations and the 
expropriation of Māori land. From the 1840s on, large, loosely demarcated 
areas that were not heavily cultivated by Māori became the subject of systematic 
blanket purchases wherein the Māori claim was resigned in return for trifles. 
These purchases were legitimized through negotiations with chiefs that Crown 
officials erroneously asserted were speaking for all claimants. Māori—whose 
concept of ownership and land rights was more complex and dynamic than 
the European one of fixed, individual property—assumed that they still had 
hunting and fishing privileges on these lands until the fencing of plots and the 
draining of swamps and wetlands made these impossible.17 At the very time that 
Butler was becoming a made man in Canterbury, wars in the North Island’s 
Taranaki and the Waikato were challenging Crown land claims and the under-
mining of communal ownership. In his letters home, later published as A First 
Year in Canterbury Settlement (1914), virtually Butler’s only comment on indige-
nous New Zealand was that “there are few Maoris here; they inhabit the North 
Island, and are degenerate in this, so they may be passed over unnoticed” (127).
Yet as indifferent as the novel appears in these early chapters to the dev-
astating effects of enclosure, settlement, and colonial trade on the Māori eco-
nomic base, it never quite forgets them. By the end of the story, Higgs’s colonial 
scheming threatens to reduce the Erewhonian race to utter dispossession, while 
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he leaves Erewhon with his confident entrepreneurial spirit of  adventure intact. 
What enables us to read this contrast satirically are the intervening  chapters in 
which the notion of human autonomy is so completely undermined that even 
the humanness of the settler may seem uncertain, echoing the fear that Butler 
had revealed in his New Zealand journals about becoming identified with his 
animal charges. At least temporarily enthralled by the history of Erewhon’s 
manners, Higgs reproduces lengthy passages from Erewhon’s revered “The 
Book of the Machines,” asking “where does consciousness begin and where 
does it end? Who can draw the line? Who can draw any line? Is not every-
thing interwoven with everything?” (234). Not only are we unable to establish 
a firm boundary between humans and other life forms, but also the cognitive 
talents that we identify as evidence of our evolutionary superiority over other 
creatures depend on machine technology. Moreover, machines are becoming 
indistinguishable from living things: while primitive tools like the axe and the 
hammer “received their impressions through the agency of man’s senses” and 
were fed through his stomach, steam-driven machines begin to eat and breathe 
and act upon the world independently of their human hosts (239). If we try to 
separate animals from machines by declaring that the latter cannot reproduce, 
we run quickly into the objection that, while they require the intervention of 
human agency to do so, so too does the clover require the agency of the bee. In 
addition to the dreadful spectacle of machinate pseudo-humans in “The Book 
of the Machines,” chapters on “Rights of Animals” and “Rights of Vegetables” 
(added to a later edition of the novel) also draw attention to the blurring of 
human/non-human boundaries. As Philip Armstrong has noted, these chap-
ters fictionalize Butler’s peculiar brand of Lamarckism, in which the develop-
ment of all life forms is connected through unconscious ancestral memory, 
thereby bringing human and non-human into evolutionary proximity.
So if it reveals that all entities—both organic and non-organic—emerge 
and reproduce within a mighty web that connects them all, why doesn’t 
Erewhon attempt a greater map of what Eliot calls “inevitable kinship”? The 
answer can perhaps be found in the second chapter focused on “The Book of 
the Machines,” which records a rejoinder to the position outlined in the first 
(hereafter referred to as the work of “the second author”). This second author 
has challenged the arguments that machine technology threatens the domi-
nance of the human species, and argued instead that human inventions are so 
entwined in man’s physical being that they should be regarded as “extra cor-
poreal limbs” (267). A man who digs with a spade has an artificially extended 
forearm; “an organ commonly called an umbrella” protects us from the rain; 
a man’s memory “goes in his pocket book” (269). Yet it is not only objects 
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that are, as Martin Heidegger would say, “primordial” and “ready-to-hand” that 
should be seen as limb extensions, but also those that may exist remotely from 
the body (98). While “lower animals keep all their limbs at home in their own 
bodies . . . many of man’s are loose, and lie about detached, now here and now 
there, in various parts of the world” (Erewhon 267). They may even be commu-
nally owned limbs, “for a train is only a seven-leagued foot that five hundred 
may own at once” (268). What is unique to human beings among animals is a 
machinate corporeality, the result of deliberate foresight and self- modification 
that has made civilization possible, thus further distancing us from our ani-
mal relatives, and also from those members of the human species whose tool-
use entails less extension. Not only, therefore, are civilized men able to stretch 
their bodies out across the globe and through the engines that draw remote 
regions of the empire together—mobilizing labor and consolidating capital—
but also their very particular kind of humanness originates in the abstraction 
of machine-enhanced labor power in the global marketplace: “it was this [sec-
ond] writer,” Higgs adds, “who originated the custom of classifying men by 
their horse-power” and divides them into categories of “genera, species, vari-
eties, and sub varieties . . . which expressed the number of limbs which they 
could command at any moment” (269). In Life and Habit (1878), Butler argues 
that organic personality emerges out of inherited memory, through “vast” and 
“infinite” repetitions that create types and organize the reproductive script in 
nature (50). The machinate human personality, by contrast, is spread across the 
planet through newly enclosed and commercially networked spaces of empire.
This affirmation of a machinate humanity seems to earn Higgs’s 
approval. But it prompts the reader’s discomfort, particularly as it becomes 
associated with Higgs’s own entrepreneurial designs. These are revealed in all 
of their hypocrisy at the end of the novel. Having successfully escaped from 
Erewhon and returned to London, Higgs develops a scheme for the com-
bined servitude and conversion of the Erewhonians. Sugar plantation owners 
in Queensland, he reflects, are “in great want of labour” (316). By luring 
adventurous Erewhonians there with the promise that they can amass great 
fortunes, he will earn a sizeable enough dividend “which might be spent in 
repeating our operation and bringing over other cargoes of Erewhonians, 
with fresh consequent profits” (316). The success of this undertaking would 
be assured by the expedience of shipping them across the Tasman in condi-
tions that recall those of the Atlantic Passage: “a cargo of seven or eight hun-
dred. . . . packed closely and fed at a very reasonable cost” (316). At the same 
time, they would “benefit” from the religious instruction, “whereof they stand 
so greatly in need,” provided by their employers. Indeed, other Christian 
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colonies might be served in the same way, since “the supply of Erewhonians 
would be unlimited” (316). The novel concludes by inviting applications for 
shares in the “Erewhon Evangelization Company Ltd.,” and by revealing that 
Chowbok has become a Christian missionary, bringing Higgs “some satisfac-
tion that [his] own efforts might have contributed to the change that had 
doubtless been wrought upon him” (320). The suggestion that “saving souls” 
and “filling pockets” are one and the same project—particularly given that 
Butler fled to the colonies in order to escape familial expectation that he 
would take orders—brings the satiric target of “The Book of the Machines” 
more clearly into focus (317). Higgs’s revelation at the end of his narrative—
that the whole account of Erewhon has been an elaborate advertisement 
to potential shareholders—suggests that his hypocritical entrepreneurial 
designs have been a target of Butler’s mockery all along.
Where the great Victorian novel represents the tangle of human and 
non-human beings through the intertwining of agencies that gives depth and 
complexity to human characters, or that animates non-human ones, Erewhon 
highlights a modern form of human autonomy that is nonetheless bound closely 
to the machine. The “machinate mammal” is the made man: a being abstracted 
into the profits that he draws from his land or other colonial ventures, and that 
he multiplies through the trading networks of the empire (Erewhon 267). At 
the same time, he extends himself through technologies that enable the rapid 
movement of goods and money across great distances, and that draw the farthest 
reaches of that empire into one magnificent network. As a man of business, 
then, Higgs is marvelously disembodied: he is a specimen of what the second 
author calls “those mighty organisms . . . our leading bankers and merchants 
[who] speak to their congeners through the length and breadth of the land in 
a second of time; [and whose] rich and subtle souls can defy all material imped-
iment.” In contrast, the poor and dispossessed remain “clogged and hampered 
by matter, which sticks fast about them as treacle to the wings of a fly.” These 
lesser beings are immune to the transformative power of steam, track, or tele-
graph; their “dull” ears “must take days or weeks to hear what another would 
tell them from a distance, instead of hearing it in a second as is done by the 
more highly organized classes” (270). Applauding how the train has become 
an adaptive extension of the body in the figure of the made man, the second 
author concludes:
Who shall deny that one who can tack on a special train to his identity, and go where-
soever he will whensoever he pleases, is more highly organized than he who, should 
he wish for the same power, might wish for the wings of a bird with an equal chance 
of getting them; and whose legs are his only means of locomotion? (270)
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Although he suffers no Gulliver-like humiliation at the end of Erewhon, Higgs 
too becomes the object of his author’s satire as the profit-lust of the made man, 
harnessed to the networking technologies of imperial commerce, so clearly 
feeds on the primitive, sluggish bodies of the poor and the colonized.
Latour uses “The Book of the Machines” as a parable for the silencing of the 
non-human in rather the same way that Karl Marx compresses Daniel Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe (1719) into an allegory for the pre-social determination of value 
in Capital: Critique of Political Economy (1867). In order to produce these accounts, 
both Latour and Marx have to forget the presence of colonized and classed sub-
jects in narratives that combine the projects of enclosure and global commercial 
enterprise. These are, for Butler, the matter-heavy, primitive bodies of those who 
cannot participate in the profit-making extension of limbs from the commercial 
core into the industrializing peripheries of empire. They are specifically and his-
torically not entangled with the remote, machinate non-human. As much as giving 
voice to the passions of machines may deepen and broaden representations of the 
social in the great novel of the North, Butler’s “The Book of the Machines” reveals 
how, in a small country in the South Pacific, machine life can quickly transform 
into colonial capital, separating the disembodied and powerfully networked colo-
nizer from the bodies of forced laborers and increasingly landless peoples.
In Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2005), 
Latour again praises Erewhon for drawing attention to the role of non-humans 
in social networks where they ordinarily remain invisible or muted. Butler, he 
suggests, alerts us to the value of “good” texts, those that “take into account at 
least some of the many quirks of their recalcitrant objects” (125). Above all, a 
good text “traces a network” in which every participant, human or non-human, 
is an actor (128). Yet through its complex satiric layering, Erewhon offers a cau-
tion. In our enthusiasm for the great novel’s exquisite tracing of network and 
its patient attention to the non-human, Butler warns, we may forget to read for 
histories of dispossession and dehumanization in which networks themselves 
remain far from innocent.
University of Kansas
NOTES
I wish to thank Rae Greiner, Ivan Kreilkamp, Kathryn Conrad, and my anonymous read-
ers for their enormously thorough and helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. See also Grossman, Gibson, Brake, Hensley, Worth.
2. See Freedgood, 1–29.
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3. See Isobel Armstrong.
4. I combine studies of “objects” and “things” here, but these are philosophically 
distinct. Latour proposes that we recognize the webby nature of both, challenging 
Heidegger’s distinction between the “thing” (as a form of gathering that reveals being) 
and the “object” (which is held in standing reserve by the regime of modern technology). 
Latour asks “what would happen . . . if we tried to talk about the object of science and tech-
nology, the Gegenstand [the object; literally, a “standing against”], as if it had the rich and 
complicated qualities of the celebrated Thing ?” (“Critique” 233). In Brown’s very different 
account, “things” are former objects that have ceased, even momentarily, to work for us 
either as shapers of subjectivity or circuits of production, distribution, and consumption 
(4). On the application of thing theory to Victorian Studies, see Boehm, Sattaur.
5. See Neill, 87–88.
6. See Van Ghent.
7. See Deleuze and Guattari, 284–86; Ketabgian, 55.
8. See Sussman, Victorian Technology, 38.
9. See Schivelbusch.
10. Eliot’s self-consciously shorter works, like Silas Marner (1861) or The Lifted Veil 
(1859), are equally “serious” in their concentration on the failure of sympathy (see Neill, 
107–21).
11. See Greiner, 1–23.
12. See Lamb.
13. While the narrator is not named in Erewhon, he is named in Erewhon Revisited 
(1901). I identify him as “Higgs” here to minimize any confusion that might arise in my 
discussion of “The Book of the Machines,” in which he is summarizing the writings of two 
Erewhonian authors.
14. See Amigoni, 149–50.
15. Sussman has described how Butler simultaneously recognizes the animalization 
of the machine and the machine as the principle mode of human development. See 
Victorians and the Machine, 135–61.
16. See Philip Armstrong, 442.
17. See Orange; Anderson et al., 246–48.
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